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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Tarango Deforest Padilla appeals from two Judgments of Conviction Upon A
Guilty Verdict To One Felony Count, And Order Of Commitment. Mr. Padilla asserts
that the district court erred when it denied his motion in limine to prevent the State from
presenting any items purported to be pieces of spark plug and a flashlight, because
such evidence/testimony would be both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial in his trial for
wrongful taking or obtaining financial transaction cards.

He further asserts that the

State will be unable to show that the district court's error is harmless beyond a
reasonable doubt.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
This appeal involves district court case numbers CR 2009-8325 (Supreme Court
Docket No. 38899) and CR 2009-13710 (Supreme Court Docket No. 38900). 1
(R., pp.364-65.) At the trial court, the parties agreed (R., pp.142-143, 443-444) and the

district court ordered that the cases be consolidated because the charges arose out of
the same incident (R., pp.144-146, 445-447).

The Supreme Court consolidated the

district court cases for appeal. (R., pp.364-35.)
In 38899, the prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Padilla with one count of grand
theft. (R., pp.46-48.) The State accused Mr. Padilla of wrongfully taking or obtaining
Thomas Mauch's financial transaction card with the intent of permanently depriving him
of his property. (R., p.47.) The State amended the Information to include a persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.85-88.)

1

In 38900, the prosecuting attorney charged Mr. Padilla with one count of grand
theft. (R., pp.421-423.) The State accused Mr. Padilla of wrongfully taking or obtaining
Jamie Labrum's financial transaction card with the intent of permanently depriving her of
her property. (R., p.422.) The State amended the Information to include a persistent
violator enhancement. (R., pp.493-496.)
Mr. Padilla moved for a motion in limine to prevent the State from presenting any
items purported to be pieces of spark plug ceramic, cash, a wallet, or a flashlight.
(R., pp.208-210, 523-525; Tr.02/15/2011, p.19, Ls.11-14.) He argued that the evidence

was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial. (R., pp.523-525.)
The State

agreed

not to present any evidence

regarding the wallet. 2

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.19, Ls.18-22.) Mr. Padilla requested to limit the State's evidence to
grand theft by possession of the financial transaction card, as opposed to allegedly
committing burglary by entering the vehicles and taking the cards, a location the card
owners last believed they left them.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.20, L.9-p.22, L.4.)

conceded that it did not charge Mr. Padilla with ve~1icular burglary.

The State

(Tr.02/15/2011,

p.23, Ls.7-11.) However, the State fully intended to argue that Mr. Padilla did in fact
commit burglary and, although, he did not need to use the spark plug to gain entry into
the vehicles because the vehicles were unlocked, he had the intent to unlawfully enter
the vehicles to obtain the financial transaction cards. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.23, Ls.9-16.)

1

When necessary, counsel will refer to the Supreme Court Docket Numbers in
referencing the underlying cases: Supreme Court Docket No. 38899 (CR 2009-8325)
and Supreme Court Docket No. 38900 (CR 2009-13710).
2
Although the State agreed and the court ordered that no evidence of the wallet would
be presented to the jury, the state's witnesses testified about the wallet. (Tr., p.34,
Ls.13-16, p.35, Ls.2-3, 13, p.47, Ls.21-23.) Defense counsel did not object.

2

In response, Mr. Padilla highlighted that it was undisputed that he did not use the
spark plug to break any windows. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.16-22.) No glass had been
broken on either vehicle.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.16-17.)

Moreover, both of the

witnesses admitted that their vehicles were unlocked. (Tr., p.23, Ls.12-13.) Mr. Padilla
also objected to the flashlight being admitted because there was no connection to him
and the light that the officer discovered in a backyard while looking for Mr. Padilla.
(Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.23-25.)
The district court found that Mr. Padilla had been put on notice that the State
charged him with wrongfully taking or obtaining the financial transaction, not with
unlawfully possessing the financial transaction card. 3 (Tr.02/15/2011, p.26, L.16-p.27,
L.6.)

The district court then analyzed the issue of "whether the evidence would be

unfairly prejudicial as evidence of an uncharged burglary and potentially inflammatory."
(Tr.02/15/2011, p.27, Ls.7-11.) The court determined that the two items were not bad
acts,

part of the res gestae,

temporarily connected,

and thereby admissible.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.28, Ls.14-17.) The court stated, "[the items] don't go to show some
type of independent showing of bad actor to cause the jury to make a determination that
Mr. Padilla is somehow being convicted because he's just a bad egg and does bad
things, but rather to show the potentialities of this conduct as it has been alleged."
(Tr.02/15/2011, p.28, L.24-p.29, L.5.)
The jury found Mr. Padilla guilty of both grand theft charges and with being a
persistent violator.

(R., pp.315-317, 630-632.) The district court imposed concurrent

3

On appeal, Mr. Padilla does not dispute that the Information should have provided his
trial counsel with notice that he was not being charged with criminal possession of a
financial transaction card (1.C. § 18-3125). Instead the State had provided notice and
charged Mr. Padilla with taking or obtaining a financial transaction card (I.C. §§ 18-2403
(1), 18-2407 (1 )(b)).
3

unified sentences of fifteen years, with seven years fixed, on both cases. (Tr., p.587,
Ls.7-13; R., pp.338-342, 638-642.)

Mr. Padilla timely appealed the Judgments of

Conviction. (R., pp.350-354, 648-652.)
Mr. Padilla filed Motions For Reconsideration Of Sentence Under Rule 35.
(R., pp.346-348, 644-647.) The district court denied the motions. (R., pp.366-370, 664668.)

4

ISSUE

Did the district court err when it denied Mr. Padilla's motion in limine to prevent the
State from presenting testimony or evidence about broken pieces of a spark plug and a
flashlight because the evidence was both irrelevant and unfairly prejudicial?

5

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Padilla's Motion In Limine To Prevent The
State From Presenting Testimony Or Evidence About Broken Pieces Of A Spark Plug
And A Flashlight Because The Evidence Was Both Irrelevant And Unfairly Prejudicial

A.

Introduction
Mr. Padilla asserts that the district court erred when it denied his motion in limine

to prevent the State from presenting testimony or evidence of a spark plug and a
flashlight because such evidence/testimony would be both irrelevant and unfairly
prejudicial in his trial for wrongful taking or obtaining financial transaction cards.

He

further asserts that the State will be unable to show that the district court's error is
harmless beyond a reasonable doubt.

B.

Standard Of Review
This Court reviews a trial court's decision to admit evidence for abuse of

discretion. State v. Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 51 (2009) (citing State v. Field, 144 Idaho 559,
564 (2007) (citing State v. Robinett, 141 Idaho 110, 112 (2005)). This Court must
examine whether: (1) the trial court correctly perceived the issue as discretionary; (2)
the trial court acted within the outer bounds of its discretion and with applicable legal
standards; and (3) the trial court reached its decision through an exercise of reason. Id.
(citing Sun Valley Shopping Ctr., Inc. v. Idaho Power Co., 119 Idaho 87, 94, 803 P.2d
993, 1000 (1991) (citing State v. Hedger, 115 Idaho 598, 600, 768 P.2d 1331, 1333
(1989)). Upon review of the district court's determination to admit bad acts evidence
pursuant to I.RE. 404(b), this Court reviews the district court's relevancy determination

de nova. See State v. Rossignol, 147 Idaho 818, 824, (Ct. App. 2009). The district

6

court's balancing of the potential for prejudice against the probative value of the
evidence is reviewed for an abuse of discretion. Grist, 147 Idaho at 52.

C.

The District Court Erred By Admitting Highly Prejudicial Rule 404(b) Evidence
That Was Not Relevant To Any Issue Other Than Propensity
It is a fundamental tenet of the American legal system that a defendant may

only be convicted based upon proof that he committed the crime with which he is
charged and not based upon poor character.
(Ct. App. 1994).

State v. Wood, 126 Idaho 241, 244

Evidence of misconduct not charged in an underlying offense may

have an unjust influence on the jurors and may lead them to determine guilt based upon
either: (1) a presumption that if the defendant did it before, he must have done it this
time; or (2) an opinion that it does not really matter whether the defendant committed
the charged crime because he deserves to be punished anyhow for other bad acts. Id.
at 244-45. "The prejudicial effect of [character evidence] is that it induces the jury to
believe the accused is more likely to have committed the crime on trial because he is a
man of criminal character." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52 (quoting State v. Wrenn, 99 Idaho
506, 510, 584 P.2d 1231, 1235 (1978)).

Therefore, I.R.

404 precludes the use of

character evidence or other misconduct evidence to imply that the defendant must have
acted consistently with those past acts or traits. Id.
I.R.E. 404 provides in pertinent part:

(b) Other crimes, wrongs, or acts. Evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or
acts is not admissible to prove the character of a person in order to show
that the person acted in conformity therewith. It may, however, be
admissible for other purposes, such as proof of motive, opportunity, intent,
preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, or absence of mistake or accident,
provided that the prosecution in a criminal case shall file and serve notice
reasonably in advance of trial, or during trial if the court excuses pretrial
notice on good cause shown, of the general nature of any such evidence it
intends to introduce at trial.
7

I.R. E. 404. "Admissibility of evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts when offered for
a permitted purpose is subject to a two-tiered analysis." Grist, 147 Idaho at 52. The
admissibility of evidence offered for I.R.E. 404(b) purposes must pass a two-step
analysis. State v. Johnson, 148 Idaho 664, 667, 227 P.3d 918, 921 (201 O); State v.

Grist, 147 Idaho 49, 52, 205 P.3d 1185, 1188 (2009).
First, the evidence of prior misconduct must be sufficiently established as
fact and relevant as a matter of law to a material and disputed issue other
than the character or criminal propensity of the defendant. Johnson, 148
Idaho at 667, 227 P.3d at 921; Grist, 147 Idaho at 52, 205 P.3d at 1188.
For the second step, there must be a determination under I.R.E. 403
regarding whether the probative value of the evidence is not substantially
outweighed by the danger of unfair prejudice. Johnson, 148 Idaho at 667,
227 P.3d at 921; Grist, 147 Idaho at 52,205 P.3d at 1188.

State v. Pepcorn, 2012 WL 975495 (March 23, 2012) (not official yet).
"Evidence of uncharged misconduct may not be admitted pursuant to I.R.E.
404(b) when its probative value is entirely dependent upon its tendency to demonstrate
the defendant's propensity to engage in such behavior." Id. In order to show that the
proposed evidence demonstrates a "common scheme or plan," the State must
demonstrate such a plan "embrac[es] the commission of two or more crimes so related
to each other that proof of one tends to establish the other .... " Grist, 147 Idaho at 5455 (citations omitted.)

Res gestae refers to events or occurrences that are so related and in such close
proximity in time to the charged offense that they complete, "the story of the crime on
trial by placing it in the context of nearby and nearly contemporaneous happenings."

See State v. Blackstead, 126 Idaho 14, 17-18 (Ct. App. 1994 ).

Generally, events

occurring at a different time or on a different day do not fall within the res gestae of the
charged offense; and prior bad acts evidence should be admitted to show res gestae
8

only when "the charged act and the uncharged act are so inseparably connected that
the jury cannot be given a rational and complete presentation of the alleged crime
without reference to the uncharged misconduct." Id. at 19.
In Blackstead, the only evidence that the court determined constituted res gestae
was evidence of drug use that was immediately prior in time or contemporaneous with
the charged offense of lewd conduct - the alleged victim was actually under the
influence of these substances when the alleged lewd conduct occurred. Blackstead,
126 Idaho at 16.

In addition, the Blackstead Court recognized a further conceptual

limitation on the proper scope of admissibility of res gestae evidence. Specifically, this
evidence must be so interconnected with the charged offense, "that a complete account
of the charged offense could not be given to the jury without disclosure of the
[uncharged acts]." Id. at 18.
The articulation of the res gestae principle given in Washington v. State, 118
So.2d 650, 653 (Fla. App. 1960), is particularly helpful on this point:
"Res Gestae," is a Latin term translated literally as "things done"; and it
embraces circumstances, facts, and declarations which are incident to the
main facts in the transaction and which are necessary to demonstrate its
character. It also includes words, declarations, and acts so closely
connected with a main fact in issue as to constitute part of the transaction.

Statements or acts of the injured person made or done at the time
immediately prior to the offense or so near to it as to preclude the idea of
forethought, and tending to elucidate a fact in issue may be admissible as
part of the res gestae. Further, the rule is we/I recognized that statements,
exclamations, acts, and conduct of the injured person at a time
substantially contemporaneous with the offense and so connected to the
crime as to have a relevant bearing on it may be held admissible as part of
the res gestae, whether they incriminate the accused or exonerate him.
Washington, 118 So.2d at 653 (emphasis added).

The district court analyzed the issue of "whether the evidence would be unfairly
prejudicial as evidence of an uncharged burglary and potentially inflammatory."
9

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.27, Ls.7-11.) The court concluded that the evidence of the spark plug
and the flashlight were part of the res gestae and the admission of the evidence was not
overly prejudicial. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.28, L.24-p.29, L.5.)

1.

Evidence Of Broken Pieces Of Spark Plug Should Not Have Been
Admitted

At trial, Thomas 1\/lauch testified that he had left his car unlocked leaving his
wallet and financial transaction cards therein. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.38, Ls.9-15, p.43, Ls.59.) Jamie Labrum also testified at trial that she too had left her vehicle unlocked with
her financial transaction cards left in the center console. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.47, Ls.2123, p.48, Ls.18-21.) Mr. Mauch testified that no damage had been done to his car, nor
were any windows broken. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.38, Ls.16-18.) The State did not put on
any evidence that someone entered the vehicles through any other means then the
unlocked doors. (See generally Trial Transcript.)
Officer Gonzales was the lead officer on this case. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.64, Ls.7-9.)
He testified that he found broken pieces of spark plug both on the ground near
Mr. Padilla and on his person.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.86, Ls.5-8.)

Over an objection by

counsel, Officer Gonzales testified that he had been informed through his training and
educational materials that people are finding and using different techniques "to indeed
commit crimes." (Tr.02/15/2011, p.86, Ls.12-19.) Moreover, individuals use spark plug
pieces to break glass on windows. (Tr., p.86, Ls.21-23.) Officer Gonzales admitted that
he had no practical experience with broken glass from spark plugs, however, he had
read about it, somewhere. (Tr., p.87, Ls.34.) After identifying the spark plug involved in
this case, Officer Gonzales informed the jury that spark plug pieces are commonly
referred to as "Ninja rocks."

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.88, Ls.9-13.)
10

Then Officer Gonzales

confirmed for the jury that there would be no legitimate reason for someone to have
these broken pieces of spark plug except to break windows.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.88,

Ls.14-20.)
The testimony that the State elicited and planned to elicit was not necessary to
explain the crime nor without this testimony would the jurors been left with an
incomplete story.

The testimony was not part of the res gestae.

Additionally, the

officer's testimony demonstrated that by possessing the Ninja rocks, Mr. Padilla was
committing another crime. The City of Twin Falls had charged Mr. Padilla with the crime
of possession of burglary tools and

had dismissed the charge against him.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.181, L.21-p.182, L.4; Court's A (exhibit).)

Possession of burglary

tools is a violation of Idaho Code§ 18-1406 and constitutes a misdemeanor. I.C. § 181406. Therefore, the possession of these items as the State argued constituted a bad
act. Moreover, there was no evidence that the spark plug pieces had been used during
the commission of this crime and, therefore, simply were not relevant to the ultimate
question of whether Mr. Padilla took or obtained financial transaction cards.
The presentation of the evidence of the spark plug was overly prejudicial
because it painted Mr. Padilla as a bad guy who is roaming the streets looking for the
right car to break the glass with his Ninja Rocks at any given moment. Had there been
some evidence that these cars were entered by any other means than an unlocked door
- there might be a different question. It was undisputed that Mr. Padilla did not use the
spark plug to break any windows. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.16-22.) No glass had been
broken on either vehicle.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.16-17.)

admitted that their vehicles were unlocked.

Both of the witnesses

(Tr., p.23, Ls.12-13.) The State did not

need to prove an unlawful entry into a vehicle in this case.
11

The State charged

Mr. Padilla with unlawful taking a financial transaction card, not with unlawful entry into
a vehicle (a burglary).
burglary tools.

Nor did the State pursue a charge of unlawful possession of

The district court erred allowing evidence about the broken pieces of

spark plug.

2.

Evidence Of A Flashlight Should Not Have Been Admitted

Mr. Padilla also objected to the flashlight being admitted because their was no
connection to him and the light that the officer discovered in a backyard while looking for
Mr. Padilla.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.24, Ls.23-25.)

The district court erred denying

Mr. Padilla's motion in limine to prohibit the State from presenting evidence of a found
flashlight. The flashlight was irrelevant to the crime charged and, even if relevant, was
not part of the res gestae of this case and the State's use of the evidence was overly
prejudicial.
Officer Gonzales testified that he found a flashlight. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.95, Ls.69.) The officer did not see the flashlight near or around Mr. Padilla. (Tr.02/15/2011,
p.97, Ls.3-6.)

While looking for Mr. Padilla, Officer Gonzales found a flashlight in

someone's private backyard and picked it up.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.97, Ls.7-10, 21-23.)

The officer never inquired from the property owners where he found the flashlight, if the
instrument belonged to them.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.97, L.24-p.98, L.2.) The officer also

never had the flashlight examined for fingerprint evidence. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.98, Ls.3-

5.) After the district court admitted the flashlight into evidence, Officer Gonzales said
the flashlight was of interest to him because when people are lurking at night they
usually have a flashlight.

(Tr.02/15/2011, p.98, Ls.21-25.) Additionally, he has often

times found drugs, paraphernalia, and other items in a flashlight. (Tr.02/15/2011, p.98,
L.25-p.99, L.3.)
12

The district court erred when it admitted into evidence the flashlight and
authorized the testimony of Officer Gonzales regarding the flashlight.

There was no

evidence making the flashlight relevant in this case. There was no connection between
this case and the flashlight. There was no evidence that the officer didn't just take a
flashlight from a citizen of the community by removing it from their backyard. There is
no evidence that the flashlight had any connection to Mr. Padilla. The flashlight was
irrelevant.
Assuming the flashlight was relevant, as argued in the above section C1 and for
the same reasons articulated therein; the flashlight was not part of the res gestae and
was overly prejudicial. The crime involving the flashlight had been dismissed as part of
a plea agreement in a different case.

The flashlight was not needed to prove any

element of the crime charged in this case. Moreover, the admission of the item and
testimony allowed the State to argue that Mr. Padilla was out lurking for cars, walking
around with a flashlight to break into people's cars, and by the way he may be involved
with drugs because it is commonly used to hide items in it.

The district court erred

allowing the admission of the flashlight and testimony relating to it.

D.

The State Will Be Unable To Meet Its Burden Of Proving The Error Was
Harmless Beyond A Reasonable Doubt
"If the alleged error was followed by a contemporaneous objection at trial,

appellate courts shall employ the harmless error test articulated in Chapman [v.
California, 386 U.S. 18, 24 (1967)].

Where the defendant meets his initial burden of

showing that a violation occurred, the State then has the burden of demonstrating to the
appellate court beyond a reasonable doubt that the constitutional violation did not
contribute to the jury's verdict." State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 227 (2010). The State
13

was allowed to present irrelevant and overly prejudicial testimony.

The State will be

unable to prove, beyond a reasonable doubt, this information did not weigh on the
conscience of the jurors in determining Mr. Padilla's guilt and did not contribute to the
verdict.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Padilla requests that his judgments of conviction be vacated and his case
remanded for further proceedings.
DATED this 10th day of May, 2012.

DIANE M. WALK
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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